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Several fairness concepts have been proposed recently in attempts to approximate envy-freeness in settings
with indivisible goods. Among them, the concept of envy-freeness up to any item (EFX) is arguably the closest
to envy-freeness. Unfortunately, EFX allocations are not known to exist except in a few special cases. We
make significant progress in this direction. We show that for every instance with additive valuations, there
is an EFX allocation of a subset of items with a Nash welfare that is at least half of the maximum possible
Nash welfare for the original set of items. That is, after donating some items to a charity, one can distribute
the remaining items in a fair way with high efficiency. This bound is proved to be best possible. Our proof
is constructive and highlights the importance of maximum Nash welfare allocation. Starting with such an
allocation, our algorithm decides which items to donate and redistributes the initial bundles to the agents,
eventually obtaining an allocation with the claimed efficiency guarantee. The application of our algorithm
to large markets, where the valuations of an agent for every item is relatively small, yields EFX with almost
optimal Nash welfare. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first use of large market assumptions in the
fair division literature. We also show that our algorithm can be modified to compute, in polynomial-time,
EFX allocations that approximate optimal Nash welfare within a factor of at most 2ρ, using a ρ-approximate
allocation on input instead of the maximum Nash welfare one.
1 INTRODUCTION
The agenda of fairly allocating items to agents has received much attention by the EconCS com-
munity recently. Most of the solution concepts with compelling properties such as envy-freeness
and proportionality cannot always be attained when the items are indivisible, in contrast to the
traditionally studied case of divisible items. Recent work put forth several promising fairness
notions that adapt and “approximate” the definition of envy-freeness to the case of individual
items and demonstrated that allocations that satisfy some of these notions are possible, with some
minimum efficiency guarantees at the same time.
A very natural adaptation of envy-freeness for settings with indivisible items was defined by
Budish [13] (but is also implicit in the earlier work of Lipton et al. [28]). An allocation of items
is envy-free up to some item (EF1) if any possible envy of an agent for the allocation of another
can be eliminated by removing some item from the envied bundle. It is well known that EF1
allocations can always be achieved, and recently Caragiannis et al. [15] showed that the Nash
welfare maximizing allocation is Pareto-optimal and EF1. This is indeed a success story for the
Nash welfare efficiency measure defined as the geometric mean of the agent valuations, a standard
and well studied objective that is particularly well aligned with fair division applications.
c r p n
Alice 10 9 4 6
Bob 10 6 9 4
Carol 10 4 6 9
For example, consider the problem of fairly dividing the inheritance
of four items, a car, a ring, a painting, and a necklace, among three
agents named Alice, Bob, and Carol. Agents have preferences for the
items, which are expressed in the table at the right, where each number
represents the amount in thousands of USD of how much each agent
values the corresponding item. Clearly, there is no envy-free allocation
in this example, because someone must get at least two items, and then one of the two other agents
would have a higher total value for these items compared to what the agent got. The allocation
which gives the ring to Alice, the car and the painting to Bob, and the necklace to Carol, is EF1
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with the valuations of 9, 19, and 9, respectively. In this allocation, Bob does not envy anyone, while
Alice and Carol would prefer to swap Bob’s allocation with their own: Alice values the car and
the painting in Bob’s bundle for the total of 14, and Carol values them for 16. This is still an EF1
allocation as Alice’s and Carol’s envy can be eliminated by ignoring their most valued item in Bob’s
bundle (i.e., the car) when comparing valuations.
The above allocation in our inheritance example maximizes the Nash welfare objective, which
is widely considered as an important efficiency measure for allocations. It provides an appealing
compromise between utilitarian and egalitarian social welfare objectives, defined as the sum of
agent valuations for their allocated items and minimum valuation among all agents, respectively.
Finding a Nash welfare maximizing allocation is well-known to be computationally tractable in
settings with divisible items (by minimizing the convex program of Eisenberg and Gale [20]), where
the resulting allocation also happens to be envy-free. In the case of indivisible goods, besides being
EF1, Nash welfare maximizing allocations have some additional fairness properties (see e.g. [15]),
including a remarkable scale-invariant property that rescaling the valuation of an agent does not
change the allocation that maximizes Nash welfare (see [29] for a detailed discussion).
On the other hand, the Nash welfare maximizing allocation from the example above can hardly
be considered fair, since Bob gets more value than Alice and Carol put together in our symmetric
instance1. Consider another allocation, where Alice gets the ring for the value of 9, Bob gets the
car for the value of 10, while the painting and the necklace go to Carol with the total value of 15.
This allocation is slightly sub-optimal in terms of the Nash welfare, but it looks clearly better than
the previous allocation from the fairness point of view. Indeed, observe that, inevitably, one agent
must get the car; it is Bob in our case. This already creates some envy from Alice and/or Carol. So,
it makes more sense to allocate the remaining three items only to them and give nothing more to
Bob. More concretely, such allocations have the much more appealing property of envy-freeness up
to any item (EFX), introduced by Caragiannis et al. [15]. Now, the envy of Alice and Bob for Carol
can be eliminated by ignoring their least-valued item in Bob’s bundle when comparing valuations.
Arguably, EFX is the best fairness analog of envy-freeness for indivisible items. But even though
EF1 allocations can be computed in many different ways (e.g., by a simple draft mechanism, by
the local-search algorithm of Lipton et al. [28], by maximizing the Nash welfare, etc.), for EFX
allocations, we do not even know whether they always exist. Moreover, asking for EFX allocations
that simultaneously satisfy some efficiency guarantee is way beyond the reach of known techniques.
Donation of items. A natural way to deal with the (hypothetical) issue of the existence of EFX
allocations is to consider partial allocations, which leave some of the items unallocated. The
unallocated items could then be donated to a charity or sold at auction with the profit equally
distributed between the agents. Actually, in situations like the above inheritance example that arise
in practice, it is usually observed that people donate some of their possessions to charities before
distributing the rest to their heirs. Undoubtedly, the donation of items can completely eliminate
envy, e.g., by donating all items and allocating nothing to the agents. However, although beneficial
for the charity cause, this outcome cannot be considered as good for the problem at hand. Therefore,
an important question to ask is:
How can we achieve an EFX allocation of high Nash welfare by donating items smartly?
Our results. We make careful use of the idea of donating items and hit many birds with one stone.
We present an algorithm that takes an allocation of maximum Nash welfare as input and, after
donating some of the items, outputs an allocation of the remaining ones that is EFX and has a Nash
1The instance is invariant under a cyclic permutation of agents’ names and the respective cyclic permutation of all items
except the car.
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welfare that is at least half the optimal one for the original instance (that includes the donated
items). As we show, this efficiency guarantee is best possible for EFX allocations, no matter whether
there are donated items or not. A remarkable bonus property is that the bundle that is allocated to
each agent is a subset of the bundle he/she initially gets in the maximum Nash welfare allocation.
When the same approach is applied to large market instances, where any item’s contribution is only
a small fraction of the total value of any agent, our algorithm outputs almost optimal allocations.
The algorithm can be modified to work with input allocations that have sub-optimal Nash welfare.
Combined with a ρ-approximation algorithm for maximizing Nash welfare (such as the algorithms
of Cole and Gkatzelis [18] or Barman et al. [10]), the modified algorithm runs in polynomial-time
and computes an EFX allocation that is 2ρ-approximation to the maximum Nash welfare.
Techniques. We remark that our algorithms are purely combinatorial. This comes in contrast to
the heavily used convex programming and rounding techniques for Nash welfare maximization as
well as the use of duality techniques and item prices for the computation of fair allocations.
Our algorithms do not reallocate any items between the bundles in the initial allocation but
permanently remove items from the instance. This removal operation gives us fine control of the
agents’ preferences. For example, if an agent is “happy” with a bundle from which we do not remove
an item, then she stays happy with it after the removal of an item. At a high level, we always seek to
find a complete EFX feasible matching of agents with bundles and carefully remove an item so that
the size of the matching never decreases. From the Nash welfare maximality property, we derive
that no bundle can lose more than a certain fraction of its value for the agent who had it in the
initial Nash welfare maximizing allocation, yielding the desired Nash welfare guarantee. For large
markets, we are able to obtain our considerably improved result by proving a number-theoretic
lemma using Karamata’s inequality for the logarithm function.
Significance. We employ the natural and practical operation of donating/removing items to
resolve the challenging issues related to the EFX solution concept. Our approach contrasts with the
recent attempts to mitigate such challenges by considering approximate versions of EFX (e.g., in
the papers by Plaut and Roughgarden [33] and Amanatidis et al. [1]). Instead, we keep the precise
definition of EFX and use approximation only for the efficiency guarantee which is unavoidable.
This approach of considering item donations could be useful in the study of the interplay of other
fairness notions with efficiency. Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first time
that large market assumptions are considered in the fair division literature.
1.1 Related work
Fair division with indivisible items. The rigorous study of fair division with divisible items has a
long history; it origininates from the work of Steinhaus [34] in the 40’s and includes very recent
breakthroughs like the envy-free cake-cutting protocol of Aziz and McKenzie [7]. In contrast, fairly
allocating indivisible items among agents has not been as popular until very recently. Most probably,
the reason for this delay is that the beautiful fairness notions of envy-freeness and proportionality,
that have received so much attention in the literature on divisible items, are rarely achievable with
indivisible items. To give an embarassing example, just consider a single item and two agents with
identical valuations for the item.
The recent interest for the indivisible items setting was sparked with the definition of fairness
notions that approximate envy-freeness and proportionality. In particular, the notion of maxmin
fair share (MMS), defined by Budish [13] and Bouveret and Lemaître [12] can be thought of as an
approximate version of proportionality and has received much attention recently, e.g., see [2, 9, 24,
26]. Besides the concepts of EF1 and EFX mentioned above, approximate versions of envy-freeness
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include epistemic envy-freeness [6] or notions that require the minimization of the envy-ratio [28]
and degree of envy [16, 32] objectives.
As mentioned earlier, EF1 is easy to achieve with several different methods. What is really
challenging is to achieve EF1 and Pareto-optimality simultaneously. This was proved to be possible
in [15], by an allocation of maximum Nash welfare. The popular website Spliddit [25], available
at www.spliddit.org, returns such allocations as part of its “Divide goods” application. Following
[15], Barman et al. [10] investigate whether EF1 and Pareto-optimal allocations can be computed
efficiently and present a pseudo-polynomial-time algorithm.
Unlike EF1, the existence of EFX allocations is still a mystery, even for three agents with additive
valuations. Plaut and Roughgarden [33] prove the existence of EFX allocations for setting with two
agents only or with more agents and identical valuations. In addition, they present an algorithm
for computing an 1/2-EFX allocation, where the value of each agent from her bundle is at least
half of what the EFX property requires it to be. Caragiannis et al. [15] and Amanatidis et al. [1]
consider different approximations of EFX (namely, approximations of the strongly related pairwise
MMS fairness concept).
Nash welfare. The history of Nash social welfare (or, simply, Nash welfare) dates back to the 50’s,
where it was used in bargaining problems [30]. In fair division, it is considered as a good measure
to balance fairness with efficiency. In particular, in settings with divisible items, maximizing the
Nash welfare can be done in polynomial-time using the convex program of Eisenberg and Gale [20],
which also leads to envy-free allocations. Unfortunately, such nice properties dissappear in the
indivisible items setting as the problem of computing an allocation of maximum Nash welfare
becomes APX-hard [27] (see also [31] for a weaker hardness result). Still, as the Nash welfare is a
very important efficiency measure, several constant-approximation algorithms have been proposed
recently. The first such algorithm was due to Gkatzelis and Cole [18] and approximates the Nash
welfare within a factor of 2.89. This was improved to 2 by Cole et al. [17], and further to 1.45 by
Barman et al. [10]. See also [4, 5, 23] for approximation algorithms in more general settings (with
non-additive valuations). With the exception of [10] that uses item pricing techniques, rounding of
convex programming relaxations is the main algorithmic tool in this line of research.
Other related papers. Our main positive result bounds the efficiency gap of the best EFX allocation
in terms of Nash welfare. As such, this is a price of fairness result, a notion that was introduced
independently by Bertsimas et al. [11] and Caragiannis et al. [14]. Also, the general structure of
our algorithms has conceptual similarities (but also many technical differences) to algorithms for
computing combinatorial walrasian equilibria [21], where items are packaged into groups instead
of being donated. Finally, we remark that large market assumptions have been considered in a
few different areas recently, such as in the study of the price of anarchy of large games [19, 22],
in budget-feasible mechanisms [3], and in optimizing over (very different from ours) fairness
constraints [8].
1.2 Roadmap
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We begin with formal definitions in Section 2. Our
counter-example showing that the Nash welfare of EFX allocations can be far from optimal is given
in Section 3. The description and analysis of our main positive result is presented in Section 4. Our
modifications that allow the algorithm work with allocations of sub-optimal Nash welfare on input
are given in Section 5. The large market assumption is considered in Section 6. We conclude in
Section 7 with a short discussion and open problems.
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2 PRELIMINARIES
Let N be the set of n agents andM be the set ofm indivisible items. We enumerate agents and
items from 1 through n and throughm, respectively. We will often refer to the set of agents N as
[n] and to the set of itemsM as [m], where [k] def= {1, 2, . . . ,k} for any positive integer number
k . Each agent i ∈ N is endowed with a valuation function vi : M → R+, where R+ is the set of
positive real numbers. Valuations are additive; by slight abuse of notation, agent i has a value of
vi (S) def= ∑д∈S vi (д) for any set S ⊆ M.
We refer to a set of items as a bundle and extensively consider partitions of items into bundles.
Formally, a partition of a set of items S ⊆ M is a set of n disjoint bundles B = {B1, . . . ,Bn} such
that Bi ∩ Bj = ∅ and ⋃i ∈[n] Bi = S . An allocation X = (X1, . . . ,Xn) of the items in S ⊆ M to the
agents of N is an ordered partition of the item set S , where each agent i ∈ [n] gets the bundle Xi .
We denote the set of all possible allocations of S to the agents ofN as X(S). From now on, the term
allocation implies an allocation to the agents of N .
An allocation X = (X1, . . . ,Xn) is called
• envy-free (EF) if vi (Xi ) ≥ vi (X j ) for any i, j ∈ N ;
• envy-free up to one item (EF1) if vi (Xi ) ≥ minд∈X j vi (X j − {д}) for any i, j ∈ N ;
• envy-free up to any item (EFX) if vi (Xi ) ≥ maxд∈X j vi (X j − {д}) for any i, j ∈ N2.
We measure the efficiency of an allocation X = (X1, . . . ,Xn) using its Nash social welfare (or,
simply Nash welfare) NW(X), which is defined as the geometric mean of {vi (Xi )}ni=1. For any set of
items S ⊆ M, we denote by opt(S) the maximum Nash welfare over all allocations of S . Formally,
NW(X) def= ©­«
∏
i ∈[n]
vi (Xi )ª®¬
1/n
, opt(S) def= max
X∈X(S )
NW(X).
Our goal is to find an EFX allocation with as large Nash welfare as possible. We say that the
allocation X of S ⊆ M is α -efficient if α · NW(X) ≥ opt(M). An allocation X is called Pareto-optimal
if there is no other allocation Ywith at least as high value for every agent i , i.e.,vi (Yi ) ≥ vi (Xi ), and
strictly higher value for one of the agents. In particular, the Nash welfare maximizing allocation is
Pareto-optimal.
We now introduce large markets. These are allocation problems, in which the valuation of every
agent for any item is a small fraction of her total value for all items ofM.
Definition 1 (Large Market). An allocation problem satisfies the large market condition with
parameter ε ∈ (0, 1] if vi (д) ≤ εnvi (M) for every agent i ∈ [n] and any item д ∈ M.
In Section 6, we actually use the following weaker large market condition, which is defined with
respect to any allocation of optimal Nash welfare.
Definition 2 (Large market w.r.t. optimal allocation X). An allocation X of optimal Nash
welfare satisfies the large market condition with parameter ε > 0 if vi (д) ≤ ε · vi (Xi ) for every agent
i ∈ [n] and any item д ∈ Xi .
Claim 1. The large market condition with parameter ε implies the large market condition for an
optimal Nash welfare allocation with parameter ε ′ = ε/(1 − n−1n ε).
2If the set X j is empty we assume that minд∈X j vi (X j − {д }) = maxд∈X j vi (X j − {д }) = 0. We remark that our definition
is slightly different than the one in [15], where the maximum is taken over the items of bundle X j for which agent i has
strictly positive valuation. However, our positive results are only stronger in this way, and in the proof of Theorem 1, all
agent valuations are non-zero.
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Proof. We use the fact that a Nash welfare maximizing allocation X is also EF1 [15]. Let
us fix any agent i ∈ N . The EF1 condition for agent i implies that ∀j , i , ∃дi j ∈ X j such that
vi (Xi ) ≥ vi (X j \{дi j }). By summing these inequalities over all j , i and the equalityvi (Xi ) = vi (Xi ),
we get
n · vi (Xi ) ≥ vi (Xi ) +
∑
j,i
vi (X j \ {дi j }) = vi (M) −
∑
j,i
vi (дi j ) ≥ vi (M) − (n − 1) · ε
n
vi (M).
Therefore, for any agent i and item д ∈ Xi we have
vi (д) ≤ ε
n
vi (M) ≤ ε
n
n · vi (Xi )
(
1 − n − 1
n
ε
)−1
= ε ′ · vi (Xi ). □
3 A LOWER BOUND ON THE NASHWELFARE OF EFX ALLOCATIONS
Before presenting our positive results, we give an allocation problem where almost half of the
optimal Nash welfare must be sacrificed in order to achieve EFX, either for the original set of items
or for any subset of them.
Theorem 1. For any positive integer n and ε > 0, there is an allocation problem with n agents and
set of itemsM, such that any EFX allocation X of any subset of items S ⊆ M satisfies
(
21−1/n − 2ε
)
·
NW(X) ≤ opt(M).
Proof. Consider the allocation problem with n agents, set of itemsM def= {1, ..., 2n − 1}, and
valuation function vi : M → R+ of agent i ∈ [n] that is defined as follows:
vi (д) def=

1 when д ∈ {1, ...,n − 1},
1 − ε when д = 2n − i,
ε/2n , otherwise.
The allocation X∗ = (X ∗1 , ...,X ∗n)withX ∗i = {i, 2n− i} for i ∈ [n−1], andX ∗n = {n} has Nash welfare
NW(X∗) = n
√
(2 − ε)n−1(1 − ε). Hence, the optimal Nash welfare is
opt(M) ≥ n
√
(2 − ε)n−1(1 − ε) = 21−1/n ·
(
1 − ε2
) (n−1)/n
(1 − ε)1/n
> 21−1/n
(
1 − ε2 ·
n − 1
n
) (
1 − ε
n
)
> 21−1/n − 2ε .
The second inequality follows by Bernoulli inequality (1 − x)r > 1 − xr for 0 < r < 1.
Now consider any EFX allocation X = (X1, ...,Xn) of a set of items S ⊆ M. By the pigeonhole
principle, there must be some agent j who does not receive any of the first n − 1 items. Then, agent
j’s value is at most vj (X j ) ≤ ∑2n−1д=n vi (д) < 1 − ε2 . It means that, if any other agent i , j receives
a large item д ∈ [n − 1], then her allocation must contain only that item, i.e., Xi = {д}. Indeed, if
there is an item д′ different than д so that д and д′ belong to bundle Xi , then the EFX condition
is violated, as vj (X j ) < 1 − ε/2 < 1 ≤ vj (Xi \ д′). This means that no agent gets value higher
than 1: either agent i gets a large item д ∈ [n − 1] and, subsequently, vi (Xi ) = vi (д) = 1, or she
gets (a subset of) items n,n + 1, ..., 2n − 1 and has value vi (Xi ) ≤ ∑2n−1д=n vi (д) < 1 − ε/2. Therefore,
NW(X) ≤ 1 which, together with the inequality on opt(M) above, completes the proof. □
4 MAIN ALGORITHM
We now present our algorithm for computing an EFX allocation of some of the items to the agents.
Together with the allocation problem (a set of itemsM and n agents with valuations for the items
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inM), the algorithm receives as input a Nash welfare maximizing allocation X for it. It tries to
match as many bundles from the initial allocation to agents as possible and repeatedly removes
items from the bundles as long as this matching does not correspond to an EFX allocation. The
algorithm is guaranteed to output an EFX allocation Y with Nash welfare which is at least half of
the original one. More precisely, we will show that 2 n−1n · NW(Y) ≥ NW(X) = opt(M).
Before presenting our algorithm in detail, we introduce several useful notions, giving forward
pointers to the lines of the pseudocode (see Algorithm 1) where these notions are used. During its
execution, the algorithm maintains a disjoint set Z of n bundles. Initially (see Line 1), Z consists of
the bundles in X. The algorithm progresses in rounds. In each round (defined by an execution of
Lines 3-12 of the pseudocode in the “repeat-until” loop), it tries to compute an EFX allocation (with
particular properties) by assigning the bundles of Z to the agents. Whenever this is not possible, it
removes an item from a bundle of Z and proceeds to the next round. When a bundle of Z misses an
item, it becomes a touched bundle.
In order to compute the EFX allocation in each round, the algorithm uses the notion of the
EFX feasibility graph, which is defined as follows. The EFX feasibility graph is a bipartite graph
G = (N ∪ Z,E) between two sets of vertices: the first part contains all agents N , each agent as a
vertex; the second part contains the bundles in Z, each bundle Zi as a vertex. Edges ofG are defined
as
E(G) def= {(i,Z j )| (i) Z j is EFX feasible for i; (ii) vi (Z j ) > vi (Zi ) if i , j}.
In particular, EFX feasibility in condition (i) requires that vi (Z j ) ≥ maxд∈Zk vi (Zk − {д}) for all
k ∈ [n]. Condition (ii) in the definition of E(G) restricts the space of possible allocations and
expresses our preference for matching agents to their initial bundles whenever possible. The call of
the subroutine EFX-feasibility-graph in Line 3 of Algorithm 1 builds the EFX feasibility graph
for the current set of bundles Z.
In each round, the algorithm computes a matching in the EFX feasibility graph. This matching can
naturally be thought of as a partial allocation of the current bundles to the agents. If the matching is
perfect, the corresponding (complete) allocation is returned and the algorithm terminates. Otherwise,
an item is removed from some bundle and the algorithm proceeds to the next round. The matching
computed in each round has particular properties that guarantee that the algorithm makes progress
during its execution. In particular, all touched bundles are matched (condition (a) in Line 6). Under
this condition, the matching contains the maximum number of edges of the form (i,Zi ) (condition
(b) in Line 7). And, under these two conditions, the size of the matching is maximized (condition (c)
in Line 8).
The algorithm finds the robust demand bundle of an arbitrary unmatched agent i (Line 10) if the
current matching is not perfect. The robust demand for agent i is defined as any bundle
robust-demand (i,Z) def= Z j ∈ argmax
Z ∈Z
{max
c ∈Z
vi (Z \ {c})},
breaking ties arbitrarily. Then, the algorithm updates the set of bundles Z by removing from the
robust-demand bundle Z j the least valued item of agent i (Line 11). The definition of the robust
demand guarantees that the bundle Z j will be EFX feasible for agent i in the next round. In addition,
as we will see, the edge (i,Z j ) will belong to the EFX feasibility graph in the next iteration.
Algorithm 1 will eventually terminate and output some allocation Y, since in every iteration
of the repeat loop (except the last time t¯ ) it removes an item from M. Next, we need to argue
that in every iteration t ∈ {0, . . . , t¯} of the repeat loop the algorithm is correct, i.e., that in
Line 6 of Algorithm 1, all touched bundles from T (t) can be simultaneously matched in graph
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Input: allocation X = (X1, . . . ,Xn) ofM, such that NW(X) = opt(M).
Output: allocation Y = (Y1, . . . ,Yn) of a set S ⊆ M.
1 Let Z = (Z1, . . . ,Zn) ← (X1, . . . ,Xn) be an ordered partition ofM.
2 repeat
3 G ← EFX-feasibility-graph([n],Z);
4 Let T be the set of touched bundles in Z;
5 LetM be a matching in G such that
6 (a) All bundles in T are matched inM ,
7 (b) Under (a), |M ∩ {(i,Zi ) : i ∈ [n]} | is maximized, and
8 (c) Under (a) and (b), |M | is maximized;
9 if ∃i ∈ [n] not matched inM then
10 Z j ← robust-demand(i,Z);
11 Z← (Z1, . . . ,Z j−1,Z j \ {c},Z j+1, . . . ,Zn), where c ∈ {argminд∈Z j vi (д)};
12 end
13 until |M | = n;
14 return Y = (M(1), . . . ,M(n)) ; ▷ It must be the case {M(i) = Zi }i ∈[n].
Algorithm 1: Computes an EFX allocation of high Nash welfare.
G(t) def= EFX-feasibility-graph([n],Z(t))3. This is proved in Lemma 1; the proof uses several
useful observations about the structure of the EFX feasibility graph G(t).
Lemma 1. All bundles in T (t) can be simultaneously matched to agents in G(t) at any iteration t .
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on t . For t = 0, the statement is true, as T (0) = ∅ and
we can choose M(0) = ∅. We assume that at time t < t¯ the matching M(t) covers all bundles
from T (t). Let us assume that agent i∗ is chosen in the execution of the if statement (Line 9
of Algorithm 1) at time t and the item c∗ ∈ {argminд∈Z j∗ (t )vi∗ (д)} is removed from the bundle
Z j∗ (t) = robust-demand(i∗,Z(t)) in Lines 10-11. Now, in order to show that all bundles in T (t + 1)
can be matched to agents in G(t + 1), we will need a few useful observations about the edges of
G(t + 1).
Claim 2. Graph G(t + 1) contains every edge e = (i,Z j ) with Z j , Z j∗ of the graph G(t).
Proof. Indeed, since no item is removed from bundle Z j , we have vi (Z j (t + 1)) = vi (Z j (t)) ≥
vi (Zi (t)) ≥ vi (Zi (t + 1)). Similarly, Z j (t + 1) remains EFX feasible for agent i . Thus (i,Z j ) ∈
E(G(t + 1)). □
Claim 3. There is no edge between i∗ and Zi∗ in G(t).
Proof. We prove this claim by contradiction. Suppose the edge (i∗,Zi∗ ) belongs to E(G(t)), but
i∗ was not matched in M(t). Then we may increase the number of matched pairs (i,Zi ) in M(t)
by adding or possibly substituting another edge to Zi∗ inM(t). As the set of matched bundles in
Z(t) can only increase after such an operation, we get a contradiction to condition (b) (Line 7 of
Algorithm 1). □
Claim 4. There is an edge between i∗ and Z j∗ in both graphs G(t) and G(t + 1).
3In the t th iteration, Z(t ) represents Z before the execution of the if statement in Lines 9-12 of the algorithm.
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Proof. Claim 3 says that Zi∗ (t) is not EFX feasible for agent i∗, i.e., there exists agent i ∈ [n] such
that vi∗ (Zi∗ (t)) < vi∗ (Zi (t) \ {д}) for some item д ∈ Zi (t). As bundle Z j∗ (t) is the robust demand of
i∗ at time t , we have
vi∗ (Z j∗ (t + 1)) = vi∗ (Z j∗ (t) \ {c∗}) ≥ max
c ∈Zi (t )
vi∗ (Zi (t) \ {c}) > vi∗ (Zi∗ (t)) ≥ vi∗ (Zi∗ (t + 1)).
Similarly, Z j∗ (t) and Z j∗ (t + 1) are EFX feasible for agent i∗, as vi∗ (Z j∗ (t) \ {c∗}) is at least as high
as vi∗ (Z j (t) \ {д}) for all j ∈ [n] and any item д ∈ Z j (t). Therefore, (i∗,Zi∗ ) ∈ E(G(t + 1)) and
(i∗,Zi∗ ) ∈ E(G(t)). □
We can now show that the algorithm will match Z j∗ to some agent.
Claim 5. Bundle Z j∗ is matched inM(t) to an agent k .
Proof. If the bundle Z j∗ is unmatched inM(t), then there is a bigger matchingM(t) ∪ (i∗,Z j∗ )
in G(t): by Claim 4, the edge (i∗,Z j∗ ) belongs to E(G(t)) and, as the agent chosen when Line 9 is
executed during iteration t , i∗ is unmatched in M(t). This contradicts property (c) in Line 8 of
Algorithm 1. □
Finally, we note that T (t + 1) = T (t) ∪ Z j∗ , as bundle Z j is the only new bundle that can become
touched in iteration t . Now consider the matching
M ′ def= M(t) \ {(k,Z j∗ )} ∪ {(i∗,Z j∗ )} (1)
in G(t + 1) that covers all bundles in T (t + 1). Indeed, according to Claim 2, G(t + 1) contains all
edges ofM(t) \ {(k,Z j∗ )} and, according to Claim 4, the edge (i∗,Z j∗ ) belongs to G(t + 1) as well.
Hence,M ′ is a matching inG(t + 1). Since (by our induction hypothesis) all bundles of T (t) \ {Z j∗ }
are matched in M(t) \ {(k,Z j∗ )}, M ′ covers all bundles in T (t + 1) = T (t) ∪ Z j∗ . The proof of the
induction step is complete. □
As the algorithm terminates after finding a complete matching in the EFX feasibility graph, the
returned solution Y must be an EFX allocation. We note that Algorithm 1 runs in polynomial time:
it executes at mostm iterations and all steps in each iteration can be completed in polynomial time.
Indeed, the only non trivial part is the computation of matchingM (Line 5) under the conditions
(a)-(c) (Lines 6-8). To this end, we can assign weights to the edges of the graph G that express our
preferences (a)-(c) and compute a maximum weighted matching in the weighed version of G.4 For
example, we can give a weight of n4 to the edges of G incident to bundle Zi ∈ T , a weight of n2 to
edges (i,Zi ) ∈ E(G) for i ∈ [n], and weight of 1 to the remaining edges of G.
In the following we give efficiency guarantees for the returned EFX allocation Y. Very informally,
Algorithm 1 does not remove too many items. First, we observe that at the end of the algorithm
there must be at least one untouched bundle, i.e., a bundle from which no items have been removed.
Claim 6. There is an untouched bundle Zi = Xi upon termination of Algorithm 1.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that the algorithm has removed items from every bundle in Z
after iteration t , i.e., the set of touched bundles becomes the set T (t + 1) = {Zi }i ∈[n] of size n after
iteration t . Then, by Lemma 1, the algorithm will match all bundles in M(t + 1) and terminate
at round t + 1. Let agent i∗ and bundle Z j∗ be the ones chosen, respectively, when Algorithm 1
executes Lines 9 and 10 at iteration t . At this time, we have Z j ∈ T (t) for all j , j∗. Thus, all touched
bundles Z j with j , j∗ must be matched inM(t) (due to the condition (a) in Line 6). According to
Claim 5, bundle Z j∗ must also be matched inM(t). Therefore, |M(t)| = n and the algorithm should
have terminated after iteration t leaving bundle Z j∗ untouched. □
4We remark that this is apparently not the fastest way to compute the desired matching.
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We are now ready to present guarantees for the Nash welfare of allocation Y.
Lemma 2. vi (Xi ) ≤ 2 · vi (Yi ) for any agent i ∈ [n] and there exists an agent io ∈ [n] such that
vio (Xio ) ≤ vio (Yio ).
Proof. We note first that when the algorithm terminates at time t¯ , then vi (Zi ) ≤ vi (Yi ) for all
i ∈ [n]. Indeed, this is the case if agent i is matched to bundle Zi . If i is matched to another bundle
Yi = Z j in G(t¯), then vi (Z j ) > vi (Zi ) by the definition of the EFX feasibility graph G(t¯). Thus,
Claim 6 proves the second part of the lemma since its states that there exists some agent io such
that vio (Xio ) = vio (Zio ) ≤ vio (Yio ).
To complete the proof of the lemma, it is sufficient to show that 2 · vi (Zi ) ≥ vi (Xi ) for any
agent i ∈ [n]. We do so by contradiction. If this is not the case, let t ∈ {0, . . . , t¯} be the first
time when 2 · vi (Zi (t)) becomes strictly smaller than vi (Xi ) for an agent i after an item was
removed. Let i∗ be the agent who was chosen in Line 9 and Z j∗ be the bundle chosen in Line 10
of the algorithm at iteration t . Then j∗ is the agent for whom 2 · vj∗ (Z j∗ (t)) became smaller than
vj∗ (X j∗ ). For convenience of notation, we denote the matching {(i,Zi )}i ∈[n] byMo . We consider the
matching M ′ △= M(t) \ {(k,Z j∗ )} ∪ {(i∗,Z j∗ )}, that was also used in the proof of Lemma 1. Recall
that, by Claim 5, bundle Z j is matched to agent k in M(t). As agent k is not matched in M ′, we
have |M ′ | < n = |Mo |. Therefore, one can represent the union of the matchings M ′ and Mo as a
collection of augmenting paths and cycles, including degenerate cycles that consist of a single edge
that belongs to bothM ′ andMo .
First, assume that M ′ ∪ Mo has a non-degenerate cycle C with 2k vertices {j1, . . . , jk } and
{Z j1 , . . . ,Z jk }.
C
def
= {(j1,Z j2 ), . . . , (jk−1,Z jk ), (jk ,Z j1 )} ∈ M ′, {(j1,Z j1 ), . . . , (jk ,Z jk )} ∈ Mo .
For convenience of notation, let us denote jk+1 = j1. Since each (ji ,Z ji+1 ) ∈ M ′ is an edge in
the EFX feasibility graph G(t), we have vji (Z ji+1 ) > vji (Z ji ) for every i ∈ [k]. This implies that
vji (X ji ) + vji (Z ji+1 ) − vji (Z ji ) > vji (X ji ) for every i ∈ [k]. Thus, we get a Pareto improvement in
the allocation X for each agent ji ∈ C by replacing bundle X ji with bundle X ji \ Z ji ∪ Z ji+1 for
every i ∈ [k]. Hence, we can improve the Nash welfare of the allocation X, a contradiction to its
optimality.
Second, we observe that bundle Z j∗ is matched inM ′ to i∗ which, by Claim 3, must be different
from j∗. SinceM ′ ∪Mo does not have non-degenerate cycles and bundle Z j∗ is not matched to j∗ in
M ′, bundle Z j∗ must belong to an augmenting path P that originates from an unmatched bundle
Z j1 in M ′; notice that Z j1 is unmatched in M(t) as well, since matching M(t) has the same set of
bundles as M ′. The augmenting path P consists of k agent vertices j1, . . . , jk and k + 1 bundle
vertices Z j1 , . . . ,Z jk+1 , where jk+1 = j∗, and 2k edges:
P
def
= {(j1,Z j2 ), . . . , (jk ,Z jk+1 )} ∈ M ′, {(j1,Z j1 ), . . . , (jk ,Z jk )} ∈ Mo . (2)
We consider the following transformation X̂ of the initial allocation X (see Figure 1):
X̂ def=

X̂ j1 = X j1 ∪ Z j2 ,
X̂ ji = X ji \ Z ji ∪ Z ji+1 , i ∈ {2, ...,k}
X̂ jk+1 = X jk+1 \ Z jk+1
X̂ j = X j , j < {j1, ..., jk+1}
Let us denote the set of agents {j1, . . . , jk+1} as J . Similar to the previous case wherewe consdiered
a non-degenerate cycle, we have vji (Z ji+1 ) > vji (Z ji ) for every i ∈ [k]. By our assumption for agent
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Fig. 1. The main argument in the proof of Lemma 2: reallocating the items of allocation X to obtain another
allocation X̂ with improved Nash welfare.
j∗ (with j∗ = jk+1), it holds that vjk+1 (Z jk+1 ) < 12 · vjk+1 (X jk+1 ). Finally, since Z j1 is unmatched in
M(t) it must also be an untouched bundle, i.e., Z j1 = X j1 . Combining these properties, we get:
NW(X̂)n = vj1 (X j1 ∪ Z j2 ) · vjk+1 (X jk+1 \ Z jk+1 ) ·
k∏
i=2
vji (X ji \ Z ji ∪ Z ji+1 ) ·
∏
j<J
vj (X j )
=
[
vj1 (X j1 ) +vj1 (Z j2 )
] · [vjk+1 (X jk+1 ) −vjk+1 (Z jk+1 )]
·
k∏
i=2
[
vji (X ji ) −vji (Z ji ) +vji (Z ji+1 )
] ·∏
j<J
vj (X j )
>
[
vj1 (X j1 ) +vj1 (Z j1 )
] · 12vjk+1 (X jk+1 ) · k∏i=2 vji (X ji ) ·∏j<J vj (X j ) = NW(X)n
We have reached a contradiction, since NW(X) = opt(M). □
Using Lemma 1 and 2, we obtain the following statement.
Theorem 2. Given a Nash welfare maximizing allocation X, Algorithm 1 computes in polynomial
time a 21− 1n -efficient EFX and Pareto-optimal allocation Y of ∪ni=1Yi , such that Yi ⊆ Xi for all i ∈ N .
Proof. The correctness of the algorithm was shown in Lemma 1. According to the definition of
the EFX feasibility graph G, the final allocation, which is a complete matching in G, must be an
EFX allocation. Finally, according to Lemma 2, the Nash welfare of the final allocation Y is at least
a 2−(n−1)/n-fraction of opt(M) = NW(X).
Moreover, if the returned complete matchingM is different from the matchingMo △= {(i,Zi )}i ∈[n],
then there must be a cycle C : {(j1,Z j2 ), ..., (jk−1,Z jk ), (jk ,Z j1 )} ∈ M, {(j1,Z j1 ), . . . , (jk ,Z jk )} ∈
Mo in M ∪ Mo . Then one can get a strict improvement to the initial Nash welfare maximizing
allocation X, by setting X̂ ji = X ji \ Z ji ∪ Z ji+1 , where jk+1 def= j1. Indeed, vji (Z ji+1 ) > vji (Z ji ) and
vji (X̂ ji ) > vji (X ji ) for all i ∈ [k], as (ji ,Z ji+1 ) is an edge in the EFX feasibility graph G. Hence,
M(i) = Zi for all i ∈ [n] and Yi ⊆ Xi .
Finally, allocation Y is Pareto optimal, as otherwise one could first Pareto improve the allocation
Y and then give back to each agent i their original removed items Xi \ Yi ; the resulting allocation
would be a Pareto-improvement of the initial allocation X, contradicting its optimality. □
5 SUBOPTIMAL INPUT ALLOCATION
One might hope that the algorithm we presented in Section 4 could also work with an input
allocation of suboptimal Nash welfare. Indeed, the algorithm would result in an EFX allocation in
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this case too. Unfortunately, the proof of the efficiency guarantee in Lemma 2 crucially relies on the
optimality of the input allocation. In this section we present a modified Algorithm 2 with a good
efficiency guarantee, provided that the input allocation is efficient as well, albeit not necessarily
optimal. In particular, starting with an initial allocation X, the modified algorithm computes either
an EFX allocation Y of some of the items inM that recovers a large fraction of the Nash welfare of
the initial allocation or indicates that the Nash welfare of the input allocation can be improved
significantly and provides such an improved allocation X̂ as output. Repeating the algorithm with
the allocation X̂ as input until it produces an EFX allocation will yield, in polynomial time, an EFX
allocation with at least half the Nash welfare of the initial input allocation.
The general structure of the algorithm is the same as before. It proceeds in rounds (defined by
the outer repeat-until loop; Lines 5-30). In each round, it tries to match as many bundles from
the initial allocation to agents as possible (by essentially repeating the matching computation
on the EFX feasibility graph; Lines 5-10) and repeatedly removes items from the bundles as long
as this matching does not correspond to an EFX allocation. The main difference of the modified
algorithm is in the selection of the agent and an item in their robust demand bundle to be removed
at each round, which is implemented in lines 11-30 and includes the inner repeat-until loop. This
step is more complicated now and may modify the computed matching as well. We exploit paths
on the union of matching M with the identity matching Mo △= {(i,Zi ) : i ∈ [n]}. In particular,
given an unmatched bundle Z j1 (defined in line 11), the algorithm first computes the augmenting
path of M ∪Mo that originates from vertex Z j1 of the EFX feasibility graph. This is a path that
alternates between edges of matchingMo andM , and terminates with an edge ofMo and the vertex
corresponding to the unmatched agent jk . The algorithm temporarily selects agent jk (Line 14,
where the set of edges of M that belong to the augmenting path is returned by the call to the
subroutine augmenting-path) and computes agent’s jk robust demand (Line 15), say bundle Z j∗ ,
but it does not remove any item from it yet.
If bundle Z j∗ belongs to the augmenting path and appears in the edge (jo ,Z j∗ ) ofM , the algorithm
modifiesM by removing edge (jo ,Z j∗ ) and adding edge (jk ,Z j∗ ) to it (Line 17). We will see shortly
that this is a valid modification that does not violate the properties (a), (b), and (c) of matchingM .
The algorithm repeats the augmenting path process until the computed robust demand bundle Z j∗
does not belong to the augmenting path. In this case, the execution flow enters the else statement
and the least valued item for agent jk is removed from bundle Z j∗ (Line 19). Before completing
the current round, the algorithm checks whether the value of agent j∗ for bundle Z j∗ has dropped
significantly below half (more than by a factor of 2 + δ1) of her value for the initial bundle X j∗
(Line 20). If this is the case, the algorithm computes a new allocation X̂ (Lines 21-25) which, as we
will prove, has Nash welfare at least (1 + δ )1/nNW(X). It then terminates, returning allocation X̂
as output. Otherwise, it indicates the end of the item removal process (Line 28), which will allow
execution flow to leave the inner repeat-until loop.
For the analysis, we first claim that Lemma 1 carries over to the modified algorithm. All we
need to show is that matchingM keeps all its properties (a),(b), and (c) after every modification (in
Line 17). As the modification affects neither the set of matched bundles, nor the size ofM ∩Mo ,
it suffices to show that the new edge (jk ,Z j∗ ) does exist in the EFX feasibility graph. The proof is
similar to the proof of Claim 4. Notice that the edge (jk ,Z jk ) is not EFX feasible, since otherwise it
could replace edge (jk−1,Z jk ) inM to increase |M ∩Mo |, still matching all touched bundles. Hence,
there exists j such that
vjk (Z jk ) < maxд∈Z j vjk (Z j \ {д}) ≤ maxд∈Z j∗ vjk (Z j∗ \ {д}) ≤ vjk (Z j∗ ),
Ioannis Caragiannis, Nick Gravin, and Xin Huang 13
Input: allocation X = (X1, . . . ,Xn) ofM and δ ∈ R+.
Output: allocation Y = (Y1, . . . ,Yn) of S ⊆ M or allocation X̂ = (X̂1, . . . , X̂n) ofM.
1 Let Z = (Z1, . . . ,Zn) ← (X1, . . . ,Xn) be an ordered partition ofM;
2 LetM0 = {(i,Zi ) : i ∈ [n]};
3 Let δ1 = 2δ1−δ ; ▷
2+2δ1
2+δ1 = 1 + δ
4 repeat
5 G ← EFX-feasibility-graph([n],Z);
6 Let T be the set of touched bundles in Z;
7 Compute a matchingM in G such that
8 (a) All bundles in T are matched inM ,
9 (b) Under (a), |M ∩M0 | is maximized, and
10 (c) Under (a) and (b), |M | is maximized;
11 Let Z j1 be an unmatched bundle inM ;
12 repeat
13 itemremoved← false;
14 Let P = {(j1,Z j2 ), . . . , (jk−1,Z jk )} ← augmenting-path(Z j1 ,M ∪M0);
15 Z j∗ ← robust-demand(jk ,Z);
16 if ∃(jo ,Z j∗ ) ∈ P then
17 M ← M \ {(jo ,Z j∗ )} ∪ {(jk ,Z j∗ )};
18 else
19 Z← (Z1, . . . ,Z j∗−1,Z j∗ \ {c},Z j∗+1, . . . ,Zn), where c ∈ {argminд∈Z j∗ vjk (д)};
20 if (2 + δ1)vj∗ (Z j∗ ) < vj∗ (X j∗ ) then
21 X̂ j1 ← X j1 ∪ Z j2 ;
22 X̂ ji ← X ji \ Z ji ∪ Z ji+1 for i = 2, . . .k − 1;
23 X̂ jk ← X jk \ Z jk ∪ Z j∗ ;
24 X̂ j∗ ← X j∗ \ Z j∗ ;
25 X̂i ← Xi for i ∈ [n] \ {j1, j2, ..., jk , j∗}.
26 return X̂;
27 end
28 itemremoved← true;
29 end
30 until itemremoved;
31 until |M | = n;
32 return Y = (M(1), . . . ,M(n));
Algorithm 2: Computes an EFX allocation of high Nash welfare or indicates that a significant
improvement to the Nash welfare of the input allocation is possible.
where the second inequality follows since Z j∗ is the robust demand of agent jk . Hence, the edge
(jk ,Z j∗ ) indeed belongs to the EFX feasibility graph.
Now, if the algorithm terminates by returning allocation Y in Line 32, this will be an EFX
allocation satisfying (2 + δ1) ·vi (Yi ) ≥ vi (Xi ) for every agent i ∈ [n]. Furthermore, the argument in
the proof of Claim 6 carries over, and one of the bundles, say Xio , will stay untouched until the end
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of the execution so that vi (Yio ) ≥ vio (Xio ). Consequently, the Nash welfare of allocation Y is
(2 + δ1)1−1/n · NW(Y) = ©­«vio (Yio ) ·
∏
i ∈[n]\{io }
(2 + δ1)vi (Yi )ª®¬
1/n
≥ ©­«
∏
i ∈[n]
vi (Xi )ª®¬
1/n
= NW(X).
This is summarized in the following statement.
Lemma 3. If the algorithm terminates and outputs the EFX allocation Y, then (2+δ1)1−1/n · NW(Y) ≥
NW(X).
If, in contrast, the execution of the algorithm enters Lines 21-25 and the algorithm terminates
returning the allocation X̂, we can show the following.
Lemma 4. If the algorithm terminates and outputs allocation X̂, then NW(X̂) ≥ (1 + δ )1/nNW(X).
Proof. When the execution enters lines 21-26, it holds that (2 + δ1)vj∗ (Z j∗ ) < vj∗ (X j∗ ), which
implies that (2 + δ1)vj∗ (X̂ j∗ ) > (1 + δ1)vj∗ (X j∗ ). As vji (Z ji ) ≤ vji (Z ji+1 ) for i = 2, ...,k − 1 and
vjk (Z jk ) ≤ vjk (Z j∗ ), we also have vi (X̂i ) ≥ vi (Xi ) for i ∈ [n] \ {j1, j∗}. Furthermore, vj1 (X̂ j1 ) ≥
2vj1 (X j1 ). Putting the above inequalities together, we have
NW(X̂) = ©­«
∏
i ∈[n]
vi (X̂i )ª®¬
1/n
≥
(
2(1 + δ1)
2 + δ1
)1/n ©­«
∏
i ∈[n]
vi (Xi )ª®¬
1/n
= (1 + δ )1/nNW(X).
The last equality is due to the relation of parameters δ and δ1 (Line 3). □
We keep running Algorithm 2, starting with the initial input allocation X, and, every time it
outputs an allocation X̂ with significantly higher Nash welfare than X, we let X← X̂ and invoke it
again. We stop when Algorithm 2 outputs an EFX allocation Y for the first time. By Lemma 3, this
is a (2 + δ1)1−1/n approximation to the Nash welfare of the current input allocation X. As the Nash
welfare of the input allocation only improves with time, we get (2 + δ1)1−1/n · ρ · NW(Y) ≥ opt(M).
Notice that no more than O
( nρ
δ
)
executions of the algorithm will be required before Algorithm 2
outputs EFX allocation Y. Indeed, by Lemma 4, we know that, after every n updates of X ← X̂,
the Nash welfare of X increases by a factor of at least (1 + δ ), yielding an additive improvement
to the Nash welfare of at least δ · NW(X) ≥ δρ opt(M). Thus, if the Algorithm 2 does not output
Y, NW(X) would become larger than opt(M) after O ( nρδ ) updates X← X̂. Setting δ = 12n+1 , and,
consequently, δ1 = 1n we obtain a 2ρ-approximation
5 after at mostO
(
n2
)
executions of Algorithm 2.
The following statement summarizes the discussion of this section.
Theorem 3. On input a ρ-efficient allocation, Algorithm 2 returns a 2ρ-efficient EFX allocation
after at most O(n2) repeated executions.
6 LARGE MARKETS
In this section, we give an improved guarantee for the Nash social welfare of the EFX allocation Y
produced by Algorithm 1, if the initial Nash social welfare maximizing allocation X satisfies the
large market condition with a parameter ε .
Theorem 4. If the input allocation X satisfies the large market condition with a parameter ε , then
Algorithm 1 outputs a
(
1 + 8
√
ε
)
-efficient EFX allocation Y.
5We get (2 + δ1)1−1/n · ρ-efficiency for the allocation Y, where (2 + 1n )1−1/n < 2.
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Proof. In order to show the stated guarantee, we prove a stronger version of Lemma 2 where,
instead of the guarantee vi (Xi ) ≤ 2 · vi (Yi ), we show that vi (Xi ) ≤
(
1 + 8 · √ε ) vi (Yi ), for each
agent i ∈ [n]. We follow the approach in the proof of Lemma 2, with the only difference that we
stop at the iteration t of Algorithm 1 when the condition
∀i ∈ [n]
(
1 + 8 · √ε
)
vi (Zi (t)) ≥ vi (Xi ). (3)
is violated for the first time (instead of the condition 2 · vi (Zi (t)) ≥ vi (Xi ) that we considered in
the proof of Lemma 2).
As in Lemma 2, if condition (3) is violated for the bundle Z j∗ , we can find an augmenting path P
defined in equation (2) with a set of vertices {j1, . . . , jk } ⊂ N and {Z j1 , . . . ,Z jk+1 } ⊆ {Zi }ni=1 from
an unallocated bundle Z j1 to the violating bundle Z jk+1 = Z j∗ . To simplify notation, we assume
without loss of generality that ji = i for each i ∈ [k + 1]. Hence, we have
P
△
= {(1,Z2), . . . , (k,Zk+1)} ∈ M ′, {(1,Z1), . . . , (k,Zk )} ∈ Mo .
We recall some key facts about the bundles in the augmenting path P . Since (i,Zi+1) is an edge in
the EFX feasibility graphG, vi (Zi+1) > vi (Zi ) for all i ∈ [k]. Since condition (3) is violated for the
bundle Zk+1,
(
1 + 8 · √ε ) vk+1(Zk+1) < vk+1(Xk+1). Also, since bundle Z1 is unallocated, it must be
untouched, i.e., Z1 = X1.
Next, we consider how to reallocate items between each consecutive pair of bundles Zi and
Zi+1. Unlike in the proof of Lemma 2, the reallocation of the entire set Zi+1 to each agent i does
not necessarily increase the Nash social welfare. To obtain an improvement, we have to be more
flexible and explore different reallocation schemes from agent i + 1 to agent i . Among many
possible schemes, we employ the greedy strategy. Specifically, we rename the items in Zi+1 so that
Zi+1 = {д1, . . . ,дℓ} with
vi (д1)
vi+1(д1) ≥
vi (д2)
vi+1(д2) ≥ · · · ≥
vi (дℓ)
vi+1(дℓ) .
In the greedy scheme, we consider tomove the first r items, i.e., the setR(r ) = Ri+1(r ) def= {д1, . . . ,дr },
from agent i + 1 to agent i . The following Claim establishes an important property of any such
move: relative increase in agent i’s value is greater than the relative decrease in agent i + 1’s value.
Claim 7. vi (R(r ))vi (Zi ) ≥
vi+1(R(r ))
vi+1(Zi+1) for any r ∈ {0, . . . , ℓ}.
Proof. As vi (Zi+1) > vi (Zi ), we have vi (R(r ))vi (Zi ) ≥
vi (R(r ))
vi (Zi+1) . It remains to show that
vi (R(r ))
vi (Zi+1) ≥
vi+1(R(r ))
vi+1(Zi+1) or, equivalently, vi (R(r ))vi+1(Zi+1) ≥ vi (Zi+1)vi+1(R(r )). Let S = Zi+1 \ R(r ); then we
need to show vi (R(r ))(vi+1(S) + vi+1(R(r ))) ≥ (vi (S) + vi (R(r )))vi+1(R(r )) or, equivalently, x def=
vi (R(r ))vi+1(S) − vi (S)vi+1(R(r )) ≥ 0. By the definition of x , R(r ), and the renaming of items in
Zi+1, we have that x =
∑r
j=1
∑ℓ
s=r+1
(
vi (дj )vi+1(дs ) −vi (дs )vi+1(дj )
)
. Since vi (дj )vi+1(дj ) ≥
vi (дs )
vi+1(дs ) for
any j ≥ r ≥ s , we have vi (дj )vi+1(дs ) −vi (дs )vi+1(дj ) ≥ 0. Therefore, x ≥ 0 □
Claim 7 gives us a powerful tool to balance the valuations of agent i and i+1. The major challenge,
however, is to simultaneously adjust the valuations of the agents i ∈ [k + 1] in a way that improves
the Nash social welfare of the initial allocation X. We consider arbitrary simultaneous reallocation
of items between all pairs of agents i and i + 1, where the first ri+1 items are moved from agent i + 1
to agent i according to the greedy scheme for all i ∈ [k]. We can focus only on the changes of the
allocations for the first k + 1 agents, as the remaining bundles Xi remain unchanged for i < [k + 1].
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The new allocation X̂ for the first k + 1 agents is as follows.
X̂ :

X̂1
def
= X1 ∪ R2(r2)
X̂i
def
= Xi \ Ri (ri ) ∪ Ri+1(ri+1), i ∈ {2, ...,k}
X̂k+1
def
= Xk+1 \ Rk+1(rk+1)
We compare the Nash social welfare of the new allocation X̂ with that of the initial allocation X.
ln
(
NW(X̂)n
NW(X)n
)
= ln
(
k+1∏
i=1
vi (X̂i )
vi (Xi )
)
=
k+1∑
i=1
ln
(
vi (X̂i )
vi (Zi )
)
−
k+1∑
i=1
ln
(
vi (Xi )
vi (Zi )
)
. (4)
As every bundle Zi is always a subset of the initial bundle Xi , we have vi (Xi ) = vi (Zi )+vi (Xi \Zi )
and vi (Xi )vi (Zi ) = 1 +
vi (Xi \Zi )
vi (Zi ) . Let ai
def
=
vi (Xi \Zi )
vi (Zi ) , so
vi (Xi )
vi (Zi ) = 1 + ai for each i ∈ [k + 1]. To simplify
notation, let R1(r1),Rk+2(rk+2) def= ∅, so that X̂i = Xi \ Ri (ri ) ∪ Ri+1(ri+1) for each i ∈ [k + 1] and
vi (X̂i )
vi (Zi ) = 1 +
vi (Xi \Zi )
vi (Zi ) −
vi (Ri (ri ))
vi (Zi ) +
vi (Ri+1(ri+1))
vi (Zi ) . Let xi
def
=
vi (Ri (ri ))
vi (Zi ) for i ∈ [k + 1]; then we get
vi (X̂i )
vi (Zi ) = 1 + ai − xi +
vi (Ri+1(ri+1))
vi (Zi ) ≥ 1 + ai − xi +
vi+1(Ri+1(ri+1))
vi+1(Zi+1) = 1 + ai − xi + xi+1,
where the inequality follows from Claim 7. Therefore, we can continue equation (4):
(4) ≥
k+1∑
i=1
ln [1 + ai − xi + xi+1] −
k+1∑
i=1
ln [1 + ai ] , (5)
where a1 = 0 and x1 = xk+2 = 0. Moreover, we have 8
√
ε · vi (Zi ) ≥ vi (Xi \ Zi ) by the definition of
ai for each i ∈ [k] and Zk+1 is the bundle that violates this inequality. Thus ai △= vi (Xi \Zi )vi (Zi ) ≤ 8
√
ε
for every i ∈ [k] and ak+1 > 8
√
ε . Note that we control each xi = vi (Ri (ri ))vi (Zi ) for i ∈ {2, ...,k + 1} by
choosing the corresponding number of items ri to be reallocated to agent i − 1. Let Θi = {θi,0 <
... < θi, ℓi } be the set of real numbers that xi can take for each i ∈ {2, ...,k + 1}. Then for each such
i we have
Claim 8. The set Θi = {θi,0 < ... < θi, ℓi } has θi,0 = 0, θi, ℓi = 1 and |θi, j − θi, j−1 | ≤ 2ε for all j.
Proof. Setting ri = 0 and ri = |Zi | yields xi = 0 and xi = 1, respectively. To bound the gap
between consecutive θi, j−1,θi, j it suffices to bound vi (д)vi (Zi ) ≤ 2ε for any item д ∈ Zi . We have
vi (Zi ) ≥ 12vi (Xi ) (by Lemma 2). Thus vi (д)vi (Zi ) ≤ 2
vi (д)
vi (Xi ) ≤ 2ε by the large market assumption. □
Finally, we show that there are feasible xi ’s, so that the. RHS of (5) is strictly positive.
Lemma 5. For any sequence of numbers (ai )k+1i=1 such that a1 = 0,ak+1 ≥ 8
√
ε, and ai ∈ [0, 8√ε]
there is a feasible solution (xi ∈ Θi )k+2i=1 with x1 = xk+2 = 0 such that
RHS (5) =
k+1∑
i=1
ln [1 + ai − xi + xi+1] −
k+1∑
i=1
ln [1 + ai ] > 0
Proof. To prove the lemma, we use Karamata’s inequality for the concave function ϕ(x) =
ln(1 + x). Namely, we find a sequence of feasible xi ’s such that the ordered sequence b(1) ≥ b(2) ≥
... ≥ b(k+1) with bi = ai − xi + xi+1 for i ∈ [k + 1] is (strictly) majorized by the ordered sequence
a(1) ≥ a(2) ≥ ... ≥ a(k+1), i.e., ∑si=1 bi ≤ ∑si=1 ai for any 1 ≤ s ≤ k + 1, with equality for s = k + 1.
Then,
∑k+1
i ϕ(bi ) >
∑k+1
i ϕ(ai ) for any strictly concave function ϕ.
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First, we consider the case when there are consecutive ai−1 and ,ai such that ai − ai−1 > 2ε .
In this case, we set x j = 0 for all j , i and xi = θi,1, i.e., the smallest non zero value in Θi .
Then almost all terms in both summations in the RHS of (5) are the same except for two terms
ln(1+ai−1+xi )+ln(1+ai−xi ) and ln(1+ai−1)+ln(1+ai ) in each summation. Asxi ≤ 2ε ,bi−1 = ai−1+xi
and bi = ai − xi are closer to each other than ai−1,ai with the same sum bi−1 + bi = ai−1 + ai .
Therefore, by Karamata’s inequality ln(1+ ai−1 + xi )+ ln(1+ ai − xi ) − ln(1+ ai−1) − ln(1+ ai ) > 0
and the proof of the lemma is complete.
So, in the following, we assume that ai − ai−1 ≤ 2ε for all i ∈ {2, ...,k + 1}. This means that
ai+1 ≤ 2ε · i and ak+1−i > 8
√
ε − 2ε · i for any i ∈ [k + 1], as a1 = 0 and ak+1 > 8
√
ε . Let ℓ def=
⌊
2√
ε
⌋
,
then a1, ...,aℓ+1 ≤ 4√ε ≤ ak−ℓ+1, ...,ak+1. First, we find an increasing sequence of (xi )ℓ+1i=1 , such
that x1 = 0, xℓ+1 = 1 and each bi becomes closer to the median 4
√
ε than ai (but still less than
the median). To this end, we set x1 = 0, and then, one after another, we set every following xi+1
equal to argmaxθ ∈Θi+1
{
θ | ai + θ − xi ≤ 4√ε
}
, where i ∈ [ℓ]. Note that once the sequence of xi ’s
reaches 1 it stays equal to 1, because maximal element θ¯ ∈ Θi+1 is 1 and it satisfies the condition
ai + θ¯ − 1 ≤ 4√ε for all i ∈ [ℓ]. Now, let us verify that sequence (xi )ℓi=1 reaches 1. Assume to the
contrary that xi < 1 for i ≤ ℓ. That means by Claim 8 that each ai − xi + xi+1 must be at most 2ε
far from the median 4
√
ε , as otherwise we would increase xi+1 and get closer to the median. Thus
ai − xi + xi+1 > 4√ε − 2ε for all i ≤ ℓ + 1. Hence,
xℓ+1 = (x2 − x1) + ... + (xℓ+1 − xℓ) >
ℓ∑
i=1
(
4
√
ε − 2ε − ai
)
≥
ℓ∑
i=1
(
4
√
ε − 2ε − 2ε(i − 1)
)
=
√
εℓ ·
(
4 − √ε(ℓ + 1)
)
≥ √ε
(
2√
ε
− 1
)
·
(
4 − √ε
(
2√
ε
+ 1
))
=
(
2 − √ε
)2
≥ 1,
where in the second inequality we used ai ≤ 2ε(i − 1), and in the third inequality we used
2√
ε
≥ ℓ =
⌊
2√
ε
⌋
≥ 2√
ε
− 1. We get xℓ+1 > 1, which contradicts xℓ+1 ∈ Θℓ+1. Now, it is also easy to
see that sequence (xi )ℓ+1i=1 is non-decreasing: either xi has already reached 1 and stays constant, or
ai − xi + xi+1 = bi ≥ 2√ε − 2ε ≥ ai for any i ≤ ℓ. Analogously, we find a decreasing sequence6 of
(xi )k+2i=k−ℓ+1, such that xk−ℓ+1 = 1, xk+2 = 0 and each bi becomes closer to the median 4
√
ε than ai
(but still larger than 4
√
ε). We set the remaining xi for ℓ + 1 < i < k − ℓ + 1 to 1, which gives us
bi = ai for ℓ + 1 < i < k − ℓ + 1 (recall that xℓ+1 = xk−ℓ+1 = 1). Now, it is easy to see that {bi }k+1i=1 is
majorized by {ai }k+1i=1 which concludes the proof of the lemma by Karamata’s inequality. □
Lemma 5 implies that Algorithm 1 must terminate before any quantity (1 + 8√ε)vi (Zi ) becomes
smaller than vi (Xi ), since otherwise there is an allocation X̂ with a higher Nash social welfare than
the optimal one of X. Moreover, for any edge (i,Z j ) in the EFX-feasibility-graph vi (Z j ) ≥ vi (Zi ).
Hence, Algorithm 1 for large markets outputs an EFX allocation Y, with (1 + 8√ε)NW(Y) ≥ (1 +
8
√
ε)NW(Z) ≥ NW(X) = opt(M). □
7 DISCUSSION AND OPEN PROBLEMS
We believe that our techniques could be used to show interesting interplays of more fairness notions
with Nash welfare. For example, starting from the allocation computed by Algorithm 2, one could
use the local-search algorithm of Lipton et al. [28] to reallocate the removed items and get an EF1
6The argument mirrors the one for i ∈ [ℓ + 1], i.e., we set xk+2 = 0 first and then let each previous xi−1 =
argmaxθ ∈Θi−1
{
θ | ai−1 − θ + xi ≥ 4√ε
}
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allocation of all items. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first polynomial-time algorithm for
computing a complete EF1 allocation that approximates maximum Nash welfare within a constant.
Still, the problem of whether EFX allocations of all items exist is widely open. If EFX allocations
do not always exist, our proposed solution alleviates the existence issue while providing high
efficiency guarantees. But we suspect that there is a monotonicity property that, if true, would not
only show that EFX allocations always exist, but also that they are nearly-optimal in terms of Nash
welfare. In particular, we suspect that adding an item to an allocation problem (that provably has
an EFX allocation) yields another problem that also has an EFX allocation with at least as high
Nash welfare as the initial one. Then, our Theorem 2 would imply not only the existence of EFX
allocations for all items, but also that the best among them is 21−1/n-efficient.
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